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Abstract: Most of the literature dealing with the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) has ignored the fact
that multinational enterprises (MNE) are not stateless and that their activities take place within an international
political system: the return on their FDI can be greatly inﬂuenced by the quality of interstate political relations
between their home and host countries. This paper investigates whether the quality of interstate political relations
between countries inﬂuences the volume of bilateral FDI. Thanks to the construction of a new indicator of the
quality of interstate political relations, it is found that better interstate political relations foster bilateral FDI,
though the signature of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) may dampen the impact of their ﬂuctuations. In
addition, the eﬀect of a variation in the quality of domestic institutions increases with the entry into force of a
BIT, suggesting that the latter signals the credibility of an institutional improvement. Overall, when both indirect
eﬀects are considered, the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral FDI stocks by 16%, on average, a lower
impact than those found in previous studies. This eﬀect nevertheless signiﬁcantly diﬀers according to the quality
of both interstate political relations and domestic institutions.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Interstate Political Relations, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Institutions.
Résumé: La littérature sur la localisation des investissements directs à l'étranger (IDE) ignore, en grande partie,
le fait que les entreprises multinationales ne sont pas apatrides et que leurs activités prennent place dans le sys-
tème politique international. Leur retour sur investissement peut ainsi être grandement aﬀecté par la qualité des
relations politiques entre leur pays d'origine et le pays hôte de leurs investissements. Cet article étudie dans quelle
mesure la qualité des relations politiques entre Etats inﬂuence le volume des IDE bilatéraux. En construisant
un nouvel indicateur de la qualité des relations politiques internationales, nous montrons qu'entretenir de bonnes
relations politiques favorise les IDE bilatéraux. La signature d'un traité bilatéral d'investissement (TBI) limite
cependant la pertinence des relations politiques pour les décisions d'investissement. Par ailleurs, l'eﬀet d'une
amélioration des institutions domestiques augmente avec l'entrée en application d'un TBI, ce qui suggère que ces
accords signalent la crédibilité des institutions domestiques. Dans l'ensemble, lorsque ces deux eﬀets sont pris en
compte, l'entrée en vigueur d'un TBI augmente les stocks bilatéraux d'IDE de 16% en moyenne, un impact moins
important que ceux trouvés dans les études précédentes. L'ampleur de cet eﬀet varie cependant beaucoup selon
la qualité des relations politiques entre Etats et des institutions domestiques.
Mots clés : Investissement direct à l'étranger, Relations politiques internationales, Traités bilatéraux d'investissement,
Institutions.
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1 Introduction
Ulysses, too, saw the value of binding himself to the mast. Constraints on sovereignty
are, therefore, the aim of the exercise. In a world of international transactions and
multiple jurisdictions, constraints on sovereignty are also desirable. Otherwise, the
potential for conﬂict and unpredictability seems almost limitless (Wolf, 2005, p.91)
The last century has demonstrated that international economic integration is not an au-
tomatic process. Trade barriers fell in the last century only because most countries mutually
accepted to do so. Although today trade is regulated at the multilateral level, as attested by
the growing importance of the World Trade Organization, international capital ﬂows, especially
foreign direct investment (FDI), do not beneﬁt from global governance mechanisms which would
enforce common rules across the globe. As suggested by Martin Wolf, in the absence of con-
straints on host country sovereignty, the activities of multinational enterprises (MNE) remain
aﬀected both by domestic governance and by the speciﬁc bilateral interstate relations between
their home and host countries. Hence, in this paper we argue that previous literature has ig-
nored an important determinant of FDI, by implicitly considering that FDI takes place within
an international political vacuum, in which the policy choices of host countries are purely do-
mestically driven. By apprehending the policy choices of host countries from an international
perspective, this paper further contributes to the literature by providing the necessary framework
to understand the eﬀects of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
Surveys, such as Transparency International (2002), clearly emphasise that, after corruption,
diplomatic pressures are an important means for MNE to gain unfair business advantages. More
crucially, foreign ﬁrms may suﬀer from the retaliatory consequences of deteriorating diplomatic
relations between their home and host countries, through various devices of expropriation. Indeed
Boehmer et al. (2001) show how valuable linkages, such as FDI, can be instrumentalised in
interstate relations. It is therefore likely that foreign investors are very sensitive to the evolution
of the quality of interstate political relations, since their deterioration could engender an increase
in the risk of seizure of their return on investment in a given host country. On the other hand, an
improvement in the quality of diplomatic relations should guarantee MNE a better protection of
their property rights. The quality of interstate political relations should inﬂuence the volume of
bilateral FDI, along with the quality of the domestic institutional framework. Hence, this paper
contributes to existing literature by distinguishing two kinds of political risks: a systemic domestic
risk, common to all investors, related to the quality of the domestic institutional framework, and
an idiosyncratic risk speciﬁc to each pair of home and host countries, related to interstate political
relations. Besides, positioning FDI theory into the broader context of interstate political relations
provides a framework in which the eﬀect of interstate agreements aiming at regulating investment
ﬂows, such as bilateral investment treaties, can be better understood. BITs act as an incomplete
mechanism guaranteeing property rights at the supranational level. As such, they should reduce
the diplomatic and domestic risks faced by MNE and, by extension, foster FDI.
The link between FDI and interstate political relations has been hardly investigated, due to
the lack of information allowing the evaluation of the quality of the latter over the last decades.1
This obstacle is overcome in this paper thanks to the use of a new database which compiles a
high number of recent interstate political interactions. The creation of an indicator of the quality
of interstate political relations allows us to estimate their impact on bilateral FDI ﬂows between
30 OECD countries and 62 OECD and non-OECD countries over the 1991-2000 period. It is
found that the quality of diplomatic relations exerts a signiﬁcant economic impact on bilateral
FDI ﬂows. However, its impact can be mitigated through the signature of a bilateral investment
treaty. In addition, we ﬁnd that the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral FDI stocks by
16%, on average, after taking into account its indirect eﬀects. This total impact nevertheless
varies signiﬁcantly according to the quality of both interstate political relations and domestic
institutions. Our results are based on a proper speciﬁcation of the gravity equation, founded on
its most recent econometric developments, and are robust to numerous robustness checks.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the diﬀerent arguments which may explain a
causality link between interstate political relations, bilateral investment treaties and FDI. Section
3 describes the indicators used to evaluate the quality of interstate political relations and explains
the speciﬁcation and data used for the empirical estimation. The impact of interstate political
relations and BITs on bilateral FDI stocks is then exposed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
2.1 Foreign direct investment and interstate political relations
Among the factors which inﬂuence the decision of a MNE to invest in a foreign country, the
security of its property rights is particularly valued, because it guarantees the MNE that it will
earn its full return on investment (Li and Resnick, 2003). Property rights must not only be
protected against the actions of private agents (individuals or enterprises) but also against the
State since it can abuse its monopoly of legitimate violence to expropriate investors in order
to improve the welfare of its rulers. The concept of expropriation must be understood in a large
1Nigh (1985) is one of the few papers in the international business literature to have investigated this subject.
He ﬁnds that conﬂictual and cooperative diplomatic relationships exert respectively a positive and negative impact
on US manufacturing FDI in developing countries. His study is however speciﬁc to the diplomatic relationships
of the United States, does not account for other FDI determinants, and only covers the particular period of the
Cold War (1948-1978).
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sense: it corresponds to [..] actions that state rulers take to improve their welfare by reducing
the return on corporate investments (Stulz, 2005, p.1597). North and Weingast (1989) show how
the Stuarts, rulers of the United Kingdom in the XVIIth century, expropriated the private sector
thanks to the use of a variety of instruments: new taxes, forced loans rarely repaid, creation of
monopoly grants, sale of peerages, purchase of goods below market price, threat of enforcement
of forgotten regulations and, ultimately, seizure of private property. These instruments are still
of use nowadays among public oﬃcials remains of actuality: Green (2005) reports that when the
rulers of Beijing city decided to get involved in the production of vehicles, they issued a regulation
stating that only the vehicles produced by the municipality-owned company could use three of
the main thoroughfares leading to the city, hindering in this way private (foreign) producers.
It is likely that the degree of expropriation to which investors are confronted depends on
their importance, in the eyes of state rulers, and on their speciﬁcities. One of the main criteria
discriminating investors is their nationality. A government facing a reelection may gain from
harming foreign investors if that allows to seduce a greater number of voters. Foreign investors, as
informal representatives of their country, may also suﬀer from the degradation of the diplomatic
relations between their home and host countries, since their expropriation can be used as a
retaliatory instrument in an interstate conﬂict. Indeed, Boehmer et al. (2001) show how valuable
interstate linkages, such as FDI, can serve as a costly signaling mechanism. These authors assume
a rationalist explanation of war, i.e. that war is the consequence of the inability of two states
to reach a negotiated arrangement, due to a lack of information on the preferences of the other.
From this perspective, the ex-ante destruction of mutually valuable interstate economic linkages
can be seen as a mean of communication through which disagreeing parties signal their resolve
by sending a credible (and costly) signal. By reducing the uncertainty about the preferences of
at least one actor, this signal favors the emergence of a peaceful negotiated settlement, without
any military ﬁght. International security concerns can thus lead a country to expropriate foreign
investors.2 Hence, MNE should invest less in countries where they are likely to suﬀer from
interstate conﬂicts, since the risk of expropriation increases. A contrario, a rise in the quality of
diplomatic relations between two countries should foster bilateral FDI, by guaranteeing MNE of
both countries a better protection of their property rights.
2.2 Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties
The expropriation risk sustained by MNE in the midst of interstate relations is related to the very
structure of the international system, in which there is no supranational mechanism guaranteeing
2It is worth noting that in this case, the actions of expropriation undertaken by state rulers do not ﬁnd their
roots in the improvement of their own welfare but in the desire to avoid the recourse to the use of violence, which
is inferior, in a Pareto sense, to a negotiated agreement which does not involve the loss of human lives and physical
destruction.
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the protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts. Countries may favor the
partial implementation of such mechanism through the signatures of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), which strengthen the protection of foreign investors against the host country's actions of
expropriation. In the broad perspective of the international political system, BITs can thus be
understood as a mean to reduce the uncertainty related to bilateral interstate political relations.
BITs are signed between two countries in order to reciprocally encourage, promote and protect
foreign investment in either country (UNCTAD, 2000). The nineties have experienced a surge
in the number of BITs signed; BITs numbered 2495 in 2005, of which 1891 had entered into
force, suggesting that more and more countries see them as a way to increase and protect their
FDI outﬂows (ﬁgure 13). The absence of discriminatory treatment against foreign investors, the
prohibition of investment performance requirements or the possibility to repatriate proﬁts without
delays are provisions regularly included in BITs (UNCTAD, 2000). More remarkably, many BITs
grant foreign investors the right to sue the host government through international arbitration,
if actions undertaken by the host government are deemed to be tantamount to expropriation,
i.e. a nationalisation or even a regulatory change (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003). This possibility of
resorting to a supranational authority whose decisions are binding on governments is an example
highlighting how BITs accord foreign investors a greater protection of their property rights than
the one they would enjoy if they could only challenge governmental actions before national
courts, which are not always very quick and fair. By giving up the use of retaliatory measures
against MNE in a diplomatic conﬂict and accepting some limitation on their sovereignty, signatory
governments state their credibility as third-party which secures property rights.4
With respect to domestic institutions, the desire of a country to trade its sovereignty for
credibility (Elkins et al., 2004) can be interpreted in two diﬀerent ways. In a ﬁrst case, it
can be considered that by signing a BIT, a country indicates that it is determined to oﬀer
foreign investors an institutional framework which better secures property rights than the current
domestic institutional framework. From this perspective, a BIT acts as a substitute to domestic
institutions which are little trusted by foreign investors. In a second case, the signature of a BIT
signals foreign investors that a country will not damage the protection of property rights already
granted by domestic institutions in order to achieve its national objectives and security choices:
BITs and quality of domestic institutions would then be complementary.
Whatever the true nature of BITs, as substitutes or complements to high-quality domestic
institutions, a positive impact of a BIT on the volume of FDI received by a host country from its
3See http://globstat.unctad.org/html/index.html
4Elkins et al. (2004) report that the governments of the Czech Republic, Liban and Ecuador had to pay 250,
266 et 70 US$ millions respectively to foreign ﬁrms for having expropriated them.
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Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC database
Figure 1: The growing participation of countries in bilateral investment treaties
signatory partner should be observed, since the entry into force of a BIT oﬀers further guarantees
to MNE about the security of their property rights and particularly on the absence of seizure of
their return on investment by state rulers. Even in the absence of a BIT, MNE may be sensitive
to the cumulative number of BITs already signed by the host country with other partners as the
latter may be interpreted as the extent to which the international community acknowledges the
host country's credibility. However, previous studies have found an ambiguous impact of BITs on
FDI, ranging from positive (Egger and Pfaﬀermayr, 2004; Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Salacuse
and Sullivan, 2005) to insigniﬁcant (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003; Rose-Ackerman and Tobin, 2005).
This mixed impact of BITs on FDI may have two reasons. First, by relying in most cases on
aggregate FDI data, previous studies have obscured the speciﬁc impact of a BIT on FDI between
two partners. Second, these papers focus on the direct eﬀect of BITs on FDI, omitting the
diﬀerent channels through which a BIT may inﬂuence the host country business environment.
Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Neumayer and Spess (2005) are two exceptions, and they reach
opposite conclusions. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) ﬁnds evidence that BITs are complementary to
good domestic institutions whereas Neumayer and Spess (2005) suggest that BITs function as
substitutes for good domestic institutional quality. Hence, the existence of this indirect channel
of inﬂuence of BITs on FDI remains highly controversial. In addition, the capacity of BITs
to dampen the impact on FDI of variations in interstate political relations has been globally
ignored. This is not surprising since diplomatic relations remain a missing determinant in
the FDI literature. Overall, the total eﬀects of BITs on FDI are unknown and studies ﬁnding
a positive and signiﬁcant impact, such as the 30% eﬀect estimated by Egger and Pfaﬀermayr
(2004), do not give much guidance on the channels through which a BIT increases bilateral FDI.
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3 Empirical model and data
It is expected that the quality of interstate political relations exerts an impact on the volume
of bilateral FDI, as it inﬂuences the security of property rights enjoyed by foreign investors.
However, in the presence of a BIT, their ﬂuctuations may matter less since the host country
agrees to grant foreign investors a stronger protection of their property rights by abiding to
international rules. In addition, BITs may act as substitutes or complements to high-quality
domestic institutions. Finally, maintaining good interstate political relations or signing a BIT
with a given partner may exert an externality on FDI originating from other countries. Empirical
testing of these four hypotheses will be achieved through the construction of an indicator of the
quality of interstate political relations and the use of interaction terms within a gravity model
of bilateral FDI.
3.1 The quality of interstate political relations
When working on interstate interactions, two types of data are available: qualitative data on
armed conﬂicts and quantitative data on daily events. In the ﬁrst case, actors, duration, geo-
graphical location and intensity of each conﬂict have been deﬁned by researchers. Such eﬀorts can
only be undertaken for infrequent interstate interactions of a high intensity like armed conﬂicts.
In the second case, daily events are automatically extracted by computers from wired reports or
newspapers and are coded automatically by actors and type of observed actions. In comparison
to armed conﬂicts datasets, it is quasi impossible to know whether these data globally pertain
to the same united historical case. However data on daily events possess the great advantage of
providing information about both conﬂictual and cooperative relations between states, whatever
the intensity of the underlying event.
The evaluation of the quality of diplomatic relations between countries is based on a new
event dataset, developed by the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) and made available by
Gary King on his website.5 Computers have been programmed to read the ﬁrst sentence of news
reports from wire services and to code each event according to the actor, the target, the type of
event and the date. King and Lowe (2002) describe in detail this process and provide evidence
that computer coding is equivalent to human coding in the short run and more eﬃcient in the
long run. The typology of events comes from Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA, see
Bond et al. (2003) for a complete description of the coding scheme).
In order to aggregate the daily events compiled in this data set, the level of conﬂict or
cooperation embodied in each case needs to be taken into account. The Goldstein (1992) scale
allows the transformation of daily interactions into two distinct annual ﬂows of cooperative
5http://gking.harvard.edu
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and conﬂictual interstate political relations.6 The values attributed to each category of event,
reported in King and Lowe (2002), are indicated in appendix A. This scale gives a score between 0
and +10 (respectively 0 and -10) to each category of event according to the amount of cooperation
(conﬂict) embodied in each event case. Both ﬂows of cooperation and conﬂict are then combined
into a single net indicator of the quality of interstate political relations (QIR) following the
transformation proposed by Pollins (1989):7
QIRijt = Coopijt × Coopijt
Coopijt + |Confijt| (1)
where Coopijt and Confijt stand for the ﬂows of cooperative and conﬂictual interstate political
relations between countries i and j in year t. This formula deﬁnes a single non-negative net
indicator which allows the evaluation of the quality of interstate political relations between two
countries. The higher the value, the higher the degree of cooperation between two states. A
value of zero means that only conﬂictual or neutral events have occurred. Data is available over
the 1991-2000 period for most dyadic interstate political relations.
3.2 Model
The workhorse econometric model for bilateral trade ﬂows, i.e. the gravity model, is now in-
creasingly used when investigating determinants of FDI ﬂows.8 Head and Ries (2007) provide
theoretical micro-foundations for a gravity model of FDI and motivate its use for modeling bi-
lateral FDI as well as trade ﬂows. Hence, our basic speciﬁcation is the following:
ln(FDIijt) = β0 + β1 ln(GDPit) + β2 ln(GDPjt) + β3 ln(GDPPCit) + β4 ln(GDPPCjt)
+β5 ln(dij) + β6 Cijt + β7 ln(ICRGjt) + β8 ln(QIRijt) + β9 BITijt + ²ijt (2)
where FDIijt stands for the bilateral stock of FDI in country j originating from country i in year
t, Cijt is a vector of gravity-speciﬁc variables (distance, contiguity, common language) , ICRGjt is
a measure of the quality of domestic institutions, QIRijt is our proxy for the quality of interstate
political relations, BITijt is a dummy variable for bilateral investment treaty between country i
and j, and ²ijt corresponds to the sum of four terms: a home country time-invariant ﬁxed eﬀect,
a host country time-invariant ﬁxed eﬀect, a country-invariant time eﬀect and the error term.
It is expected that bilateral FDI ﬂows will be positively inﬂuenced by market sizes, contiguity,
common language, quality of domestic institutions, quality of interstate political relations and
6The mapping of IDEA categories onto Goldstein scale, ﬁrst developed for the World Event/Interaction Survey
(WEIS), is available from IDEA's website (http://vranet.com/idea).
7Such transformation takes into account the interdependence between the level of cooperation and the level of
conﬂict.
8See for instance Wei (2000) or Benassy-Quere et al. (2007).
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the entry into force of a BIT. Distance, as a proxy for transaction costs, should exert a negative
impact. Finally, the sign of host country wealth is ambiguous since a high GDP per capita is
simultaneously correlated with high purchasing power and high nominal wages, each exerting an
opposite eﬀect on FDI, positive and negative respectively (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, 2003).
Time-invariant omitted determinants are captured by both home and host countries ﬁxed eﬀects
and time dummies control for the eﬀect of worldwide factors which inﬂuence simultaneously all
bilateral FDI stocks.
3.3 Data and methodology
Our dependent variable is bilateral FDI stocks [FDI]. It originates from the OECD International
Direct Investment statistics database, which reports data for bilateral stocks among 30 OECD
countries and between OECD countries and 32 non-OECD emerging countries, over the period
1991-2000. FDI stocks are preferred to FDI ﬂows as the former are less volatile, which is partic-
ularly important when working with yearly data. All FDI stocks are converted into millions of
current US dollars.
Out of 8001 observations, about 8% equal zero. A well-known problem of the log speciﬁ-
cation of the gravity model is the diﬃculty of accounting for zeros in the dependent variable,
because dropping them could create a selection bias. Two strategies are implemented to deal
with this problem. First, instead of using ln(FDIijt), we work with ln(FDIijt+1), which allows
to avoid dropping the zero values.9 Our second, and preferred, strategy is to implement a Poisson
quasi maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE). This strategy has been suggested by Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) concerning gravity models of trade ﬂows (see Head and Ries (2007) for an
application to FDI). They point out that standard log-linear models as well as Tobit models
implemented to account for selection bias yield inconsistent estimates in the presence of het-
eroscedasticity. Their proposed estimation procedure, Poisson QMLE, is not only consistent in
the presence of heteroscedasticity, but it also allows to incorporate zero values of the dependent
variable in our regressions.
Data on GDP [GDP] and GDP per capita [GDPPC] are taken from the World Bank World
Development Indicators database. GDP is in current US dollars and GDP per capita is in current
PPP US dollars. Time-invariant bilateral characteristics (distance [d], contiguity and common
language [C]) come from the CEPII.10 In addition, an important determinant of FDI ﬂows is the
quality of domestic institutions [ICRG] (Wei, 2000; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Benassy-Quere
et al., 2007). Our proxy is the composite risk index originating from the International Country
9Results remain qualitatively similar when values diﬀerent from 1 are added.
10www.cepii.fr
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Risk Guide, which aggregates into a single indicator evaluations of the political, economic and
ﬁnancial risks of a given country.11 The higher the composite index, ranging between 0 and 100,
the lower the risk perceived. The indicator of the quality of interstate political relations [QIR]
has been introduced in section 3.1. Finally, the BIT dummy [BIT] takes the value one starting
from the year when a BIT between two countries enters into force.12 Data on BITs come from
the UNCTAD Investment Treaty Database.13
Summary statistics are given in table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI 8001 3025.28 12410.2 0 303591.7
ln(FDI) 7374 5.39 2.75 -4.25 12.62
ln(FDI+1) 8001 5.04 2.88 0 12.62
ln GDP origin 8001 12.83 1.50 8.67 16.10
ln GDP host 8001 12.67 1.51 8.67 16.10
ln Distance 8001 8.24 1.10 4.09 9.88
Contiguity 8001 0.07 0.26 0 1
Common language 8001 0.08 0.27 0 1
ln GDP per capita origin 8001 9.68 0.61 7.26 10.44
ln GDP per capita host 8001 9.53 0.68 7.26 10.44
ln ICRG host 8001 4.35 0.12 3.77 4.52
Quality of Interstate Relations 8001 37.19 99.97 0 1778.64
ln Quality of Interstate Relations (QIR) 8001 2.37 1.59 0 7.48
BIT 8001 0.28 0.45 0 1
4 Results
4.1 Quality of interstate political relations
Results are given in table 2. In terms of control variables, from a host country perspective, a
large market, good public governance, shared language and contiguity tend to exert a positive
impact on bilateral investment, whereas the opposite is true for bilateral distance and GDP per
capita. The sign of the latter can be interpreted as reﬂecting the impact of high labour costs.
These results are in line with previous works using the same speciﬁcation, such as Benassy-Quere
et al. (2007) or Head and Ries (2007). Although the signs and signiﬁcance of our control variables
11See www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods for details on the 22 components of the ICRG com-
posite index.
12Egger and Pfaﬀermayr (2004) show that a BIT increases signiﬁcantly bilateral FDI only if it is actually
implemented, underlining that the international commitment of the host country must appear to be credible to
foreign investors. Hence, we use the date of entry into force of a BIT rather than its date of signature.
13http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Startpage____718.aspx
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are sensitive to the speciﬁcation used,14 it is reassuring to note that the coeﬃcient of our proxy
for the quality of interstate political relations (QIR) is always positive and signiﬁcant, indicating
that countries entertaining good diplomatic relations invest more in each other. The economic
eﬀect is substantial since according to column (6) of table 2, a one standard deviation increase
from the mean of the quality of interstate political relations increases the bilateral FDI stock by
about 80%.
Table 2: The impact of interstate political relations on FDI
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator: OLS OLS Poisson QMLE
Dependent variable ln(FDI) ln(FDI) ln(FDI+1) ln(FDI+1) FDI FDI
ln GDP origin -0.33b -0.32c -0.25 -0.26 0.12 0.26
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.20)
ln GDP host 0.98a 1.00a 0.85a 0.88a 0.23 0.40
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.28) (0.25)
ln Distance -0.96a -0.86a -0.99a -0.89a -0.46a -0.37a
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Contiguity 0.64a 0.57a 0.55a 0.49a -0.12 -0.18
(0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.14) (0.13)
Common language 0.74a 0.64a 0.84a 0.73a 0.59a 0.52a
(0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.08)
ln GDP per capita origin 1.94a 1.82a 0.71c 0.58 3.14a 2.72a
(0.43) (0.45) (0.39) (0.33) (0.84) (0.79)
ln GDP per capita host -0.58 -0.77c -0.66 -0.89b 0.74c 0.41
(0.45) (0.45) (0.42) (0.36) (0.44) (0.39)
ln ICRG host 1.40a 1.46a 1.55a 1.63a 1.22b 1.05b
(0.37) (0.37) (0.34) (0.34) (0.52) (0.49)
ln Quality of Inter. Relations (QIR) 0.17a 0.19a 0.31a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant -17.35a -4.65 -5.72a -2.70 -43.17a -38.69a
(5.45) (5.01) (4.27) (5.10) (9.62) (8.60)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7374 7374 8001 8001 8001 8001
R-squared 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.92 0.93
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are in logarithms.
Heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Our results may, however, suﬀer from endogeneity. The causality between FDI and interstate
political relations may be bi-directional since according to the liberal peace paradigm, growing
economic interdependence fosters better interstate political relations (Polachek, 1980; Oneal and
Russett, 1997, 1999; Barbieri, 2002). In addition, omitted country-pair speciﬁc variables corre-
lated with the quality of interstate political relations, may be the true factor driving the impact
14The lack of signiﬁcance of GDP and GDP per capita may be explained by the inclusion of host and home
country ﬁxed eﬀects and multicollinearity among these variables (because population varies slowly).
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of the quality of diplomatic relations on FDI. We deal with each problem consecutively, because
no exogenous time-varying instrumental variable for the quality of interstate political relations
is readily available and because the inclusion of country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects requires panel data.
The ﬁrst source of endogeneity, simultaneity, can be accounted for by ﬁnding a suitable
cross-sectional instrument. However, since even in cross-section we could not ﬁnd good external
instruments15, we resort to internal instruments, the lagged values of the quality of interstate
political relations eight and nine years earlier. These lags have been chosen according to the
ﬁrst-stage F test statistic, the partial R-squared and the Hansen (1982) J tests of overidentifying
restrictions. The ﬁrst-stage F statistics and partial R2 indicate that these instruments can be
regarded as strong since they respectively equal 47 - well above the Stock et al. (2002)'s rule
of thumb of 10 -, and 0.23, and the Sargan-Hansen test does not reject their exogeneity. Note
that country-speciﬁc eﬀects have been dropped in column (1) of table 3 and that the econometric
methodology is two stage least squares.
To remedy to the second source of endogeneity, omitted variable, country-pair speciﬁc vari-
ables which could be correlated with the quality of interstate political relations are included in
a ﬁrst stage. In column (2), historical ties, i.e. the existence of a colonial relationship and the
possibility that two countries used to belong to the same entity, e.g. Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, military conﬂict occurrence or signature of a regional trade agreement are accounted for.
In a second stage, all time-invariant (unobservable) country-pair characteristics which may aﬀect
bilateral FDI, such as cultural proximity, are taken into account by the inclusion of country-pair
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in column (3), in place of geographic and linguistic bilateral variables and
country-speciﬁc eﬀects.16 This is a particularly demanding speciﬁcation since the impact of the
quality of interstate political relations on FDI is only identiﬁed through the eﬀect of its changes
on FDI over time.
When endogeneity is controlled for, results provided in table 3 conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings
as the coeﬃcient of the QIR variable always remains positive and signiﬁcant. In the instrumental
variable (IV) regression reported in column (1), the coeﬃcient of the QIR variable remains signif-
icant and its magnitude is fairly close to what has been found previously. This is not surprising as
a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test conﬁrms the exogeneity of this variable. Results remain unchanged
when controlling for additional determinants of bilateral FDI in column (2). It shows that histor-
ical ties inﬂuence bilateral FDI but do not drive the eﬀect of the quality of diplomatic relations.
However, in column (3), the coeﬃcient of the latter decreases signiﬁcantly as the inclusion of
15We tried to instrument the quality of interstate political relations with alliance similarity, UN vote correlation,
religious similarity, or conﬂict history. However, the Sargan-Hansen test rejected in every case their exogeneity.
16We use the xtpqml Stata package developed by Tim Simcoe (http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/timothy.
simcoe/xtpqml.txt), which computes robust standard errors for ﬁxed-eﬀects Poisson models, as suggested by
Wooldridge (1999).
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Table 3: The impact of interstate political relations: robustness checks
Model (1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable ln(FDI+1) FDI FDI
Estimator: IV Poisson QMLE
ln GDP origin 0.73a 0.26 0.17
(0.11) (0.20) (0.21)
ln GDP host 0.45a 0.39 0.29
(0.11) (0.25) (0.26)
ln Distance -0.49a -0.37a
(0.09) (0.06)
Contiguity -0.24 -0.17
(0.24) (0.14)
Common language 1.04a 0.37a
(0.22) 0.09
ln GDP per capita origin 1.87a 2.81a 3.22a
(0.17) (0.80) (0.85)
ln GDP per capita host -0.19 0.47 0.71c
(0.18) (0.39) (0.40)
ln ICRG host 3.85a 1.06b 1.07b
(1.12) (0.48) (0.49)
ln Quality of Inter. Relations (QIR) 0.23c 0.28a 0.09a
(0.13) (0.03) (0.03)
Pair ever in a colonial relationship 0.39a (0.02)
(0.10)
Ever same country 2.40a
(0.35)
Military Interstate Dispute 0.01
(0.10)
Regional Trading Agreement 0.16
(0.12)
Constant 3.47a -39.97a
(0.75) (8.87)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No
Country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes
Observations 442 7956 7560
Number of country pairs 1080
Sargan-Hansen test 0.72
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level.
All variables are in logarithms. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Autocorrelation-robust standard errors in column
(1)-(2).
country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects implies that only the impact of diﬀerences in the quality of interstate
political relations on bilateral FDI over time are investigated, leaving out the additional impact of
inter-country diﬀerences in the quality level of interstate political relations. Nevertheless, in this
demanding speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of the QIR variable remains signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
highlighting the importance of interstate political relations as a determinant of FDI. Together,
these modiﬁcations of our initial speciﬁcation demonstrate the robustness of the impact of the
quality of interstate political relations on bilateral FDI.
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4.2 Bilateral investment treaties
To assess the total impact of BITs on FDI, their indirect eﬀects on the host country business
environment must be investigated. BITs may directly improve the business climate to which
foreign investors are subject. Mostly, they may dampen or reduce the relevance in MNE location
decisions of variations in both the quality of interstate political relations and the quality of
domestic institutions. The last eﬀect is, nevertheless, ambiguous as BITs may be substitute or
complementary to a good public governance. In the latter case, the signature of a BIT can be
seen as a costly signal sent by the host country to international investors about its resolution not
to resort to retaliatory actions during a diplomatic crisis. In order to account for these indirect
eﬀects, interaction terms between the quality of interstate political relations and the existence of
a BIT or the quality of domestic institutions are included in our basic speciﬁcation. In table 4,
we introduce consecutively our two interaction variables. The four ﬁrst columns present results
using country ﬁxed eﬀects, and the remaining four present results using country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects
instead.
The coeﬃcient and signiﬁcance of the BIT variable depend on whether country-pair ﬁxed
eﬀects are included (columns (1) and (5)). The fact that the coeﬃcient is only signiﬁcant in
the speciﬁcation including country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects suggests that countries choose well when
signing a BIT, as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) concerning free trade agreements.
For instance, when unobservable characteristics between two countries reduce their bilateral
FDI ﬂows, countries will be more likely to sign a BIT if the latter prevents these unobservable
characteristics to deter bilateral FDI ﬂows, i.e. if expected gains from signing a BIT are larger.
As mentioned before, bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects control for the endogeneity bias related to omitted
(unobservable) variables likely to aﬀect both the level of bilateral FDI and the opportunity to
enter a BIT. When such factors are taken into account, the eﬀect of a BIT on bilateral FDI stock
is positive and signiﬁcant (column (5)).
Indirectly, BITs seem to mitigate the impact of the quality of interstate political relations
on FDI, as the interaction term between both variables is always signiﬁcant and negative across
speciﬁcations (columns (2) and (6)). These ﬁndings imply that the signature of a BIT protects
against the risk linked to interstate political relations. On the other hand, the interaction term
between the BIT dummy and the quality of domestic institutions is not signiﬁcant, whichever
the speciﬁcation used (column (3) and (7)). However, including the BIT dummy and the two
interaction terms may be a misspeciﬁcation if the eﬀect of BIT on FDI is entirely dependent on
the quality of both domestic institutions and interstate political relations. In other words, BITs
may not have any direct eﬀect and the coeﬃcient of the BIT dummy in column (5) may only
capture indirect eﬀects, conditional on the values of the two institutional variables. The lack of
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Table 4: The impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI
Estimator Poisson QMLE
ln GDP origin 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
ln GDP host 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.29a 0.29 0.29 0.29
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
ln Distance -0.37a -0.37a -0.37a -0.37a
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Contiguity -0.18 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Common language 0.52a 0.51a 0.52a 0.51a
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
ln GDP per capita origin 2.72a 2.72a 2.72a 2.72a 3.21a 3.20a 3.20a 3.20a
(0.79) (0.78) (0.79) (0.78) (0.85) (0.84) (0.84) (0.84)
ln GDP per capita host 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.72c 0.72c 0.72c 0.72c
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
ln ICRG host 1.03b 1.04b 1.11b 1.02b 1.04a 1.05b 1.02a 1.03b
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.53) (0.50)
ln Quality of Inter. Relations (QIR) 0.31a 0.32a 0.32a 0.32a 0.09a 0.10a 0.10a 0.10a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
BIT 0.09 0.41b 1.60 0.24a 0.46a -0.30
(0.11) (0.16) (2.61) (0.07) (0.12) (1.93)
BIT * QIR -0.11b -0.11b -0.11b -0.07b -0.07b -0.07b
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
BIT * ln ICRG host -0.27 0.09b 0.18 0.11a
(0.60) (0.04) (0.45) (0.03)
Constant -38.71a -38.77a -39.02a -39.70a
(8.60) (8.56) (8.60) (8.55)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8001 8001 8001 8001 7560 7560 7560 7560
Number of country pairs 1080 1080 1080 1080
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are in logarithms.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Autocorrelation-robust standard errors in
columns (1)-(4).
signiﬁcance of the BIT dummy in column (3) and (7) provides support to this hypothesis. Once
the BIT dummy is omitted in columns (4) and (8), both interaction terms become signiﬁcant
and it appears that the impact of a variation in the quality of domestic institutions increases
with the signature of a BIT. It suggests that the latter signals the credibility of an institutional
improvement, as the host country is less likely to damage the achieved quality of its domestic
institutions for retaliation purposes. In appendix B, it is shown that results remain qualitatively
unchanged when the ICRG composite risk indicator is replaced by a better proxy of property
rights protection, the ICRG political risk indicator or when additional control variables are
included (existence of a regional trading agreement, home and host country levels of democracy,
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membership to the GATT/WTO).
4.3 Quantiﬁcation of the BIT eﬀect
The quantiﬁcation of the magnitude of the eﬀect on bilateral FDI of the entry into force of a
BIT between two countries is not straightforward because of the non-linear nature of our Poisson
QMLE procedure and the interaction terms between a BIT and the quality of interstate relations
and the quality of domestic institutions, respectively. Ai and Norton (2003) underline that the
interaction eﬀect is conditional on the independent variables. We decide therefore to assess
the impact of BITs on FDI by simulating the eﬀect of the entry into force of a BIT on the
predicted bilateral FDI stocks from our Poisson QMLE model, holding everything else constant.
By computing the predicted bilateral FDI stocks with and without a BIT, we are able to calculate
the average eﬀect of the entry into force of a BIT. For this, we use estimates of our preferred
speciﬁcation (column (8) of table 4). We also compute the average eﬀect for diﬀerent categories
of country pairs, according to the institutional quality of the host country and the quality of
bilateral interstate political relations.
When both indirect eﬀects are considered, the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral
FDI stocks by 16% on average. This eﬀect nevertheless signiﬁcantly diﬀers according to the
values of the quality of both domestic institutions and interstate political relations (see ﬁgure 2).
Corner-eﬀects can be described. On the one hand, a BIT exerts little impact on FDI in a host
country getting along well with its partner, whichever the quality of domestic institutions, since
good diplomatic relations already guarantee foreign investors the protection of their property
rights. Good domestic institutions nevertheless strengthen the credibility of the host country.
On the other hand, a BIT exerts its strongest eﬀects when foreign investors are confronted to
recurrent diplomatic disputes as it assures foreign investors that they will not be the subject of
retaliation through various devices of expropriation. The strongest impact of a BIT occurs when
it clearly signals that the good domestic policies enjoyed by foreign investors are fully dissociated
from the negative evolution of bilateral diplomatic relations. Overall, these results support our
hypothesis that the purpose for a host country of signing a BIT is to send a costly signal stating
its intertemporal credibility to foreign investors facing diplomatic risk.
4.4 International externalities
In this section, we investigate whether maintaining good interstate relations or signing a BIT
with a given partner exerts any externality on FDI originating from other countries. First, a
proxy for the quality of interstate political relations of a host country vis-a-vis all its partners is
included. It is constructed as the average of bilateral interstate political relations weighted by the
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Figure 2: Total eﬀect of the entry into force of a BIT by quality of domestic institutions and
interstate political relations
market size of partner countries (GDP). Results are presented in columns (1) and (2) of table 5.
It appears that good interstate political relations with countries other than the partner country
does not exert any positive impact on FDI. This suggests that the impact of interstate political
relations on FDI are country-pair speciﬁc and that various foreign investors in the same host
country will not experience the same protection of their property rights. In column (3), beyond
the BIT dummy, the stock of BITs, i.e. the cumulative number of BITs that the host country has
signed with all its partners, is included.17 Indeed, if BITs are complementary to good domestic
institutions and act as a costly signal for their quality, BITs signed with other countries should
also signal the good business climate in the host country to international investors even from
non-signatory countries. In that case, it is found that FDI coming from a non-signatory country
is positively inﬂuenced by the stock of BITs. This implies that a high number of BITs signals
foreign investors that the host country has been judged credible, by the international community,
in its determination to oﬀer on a long term basis a business climate favorable to MNE. This last
result conﬁrms our previous ﬁndings.
17Data originate from the UNCTAD FDI database (http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/ReportFolders/
ReportFolders.aspx).
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Table 5: Bilateral FDI and multilateral externalities of bilateral relations
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI
Estimator Poisson QMLE
ln GDP origin 0.26 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.17
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
ln GDP host 0.39 0.29 0.41c 0.30 0.41c 0.30
(0.24) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26)
ln Distance -0.37a -0.37a -0.37a
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Contiguity -0.18 -0.19 -0.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Common language 0.52a 0.51a 0.52a
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
ln GDP per capita origin 2.72a 3.22a 2.74a 3.18a 2.74a 3.18a
(0.78) (0.85) (0.76) (0.83) (0.76) (0.83)
ln GDP per capita host 0.42 0.71c 0.28 0.62 0.28 0.62
(0.39) (0.40) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39)
ln ICRG host 1.07b 1.09b 0.97c 1.01b 0.95c 0.99b
(0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
ln Quality of Inter. Relations (QIR) 0.31a 0.09a 0.32a 0.10a 0.32a 0.10a
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00)
ln QIR multilateral host 0.02 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
BIT 0.40a 0.40a
(0.16) (0.11)
BIT total host 0.45a 0.32b 0.44a 0.32c
(0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.17)
BIT * ln QIR -0.11b -0.07a -0.11b -0.07b
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
BIT * ln ICRG host 0.09b 0.09a
(0.04) (0.03)
Constant -38.80a -38.06a -37.98a
(8.58) (8.24) (8.24)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ﬁxed eﬀects Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 8001 7560 8001 7560 8001 7560
Number of country pairs 1080 1080 1080
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are
in logarithms. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Autocorrelation-robust standard errors in columns (1), (3) and (5).
5 Conclusion
Most of the literature dealing with the location of FDI has globally ignored that MNE are not
stateless and that their activities take place within an international political system. When in-
vesting abroad, the business environment faced by MNE is not only shaped by the quality of
domestic institutions: the return on their FDI can also be greatly inﬂuenced by the quality of
interstate political relations between their home and host countries. This paper has tried to rem-
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edy to this omission of the literature by testing the impact of the quality of interstate political
relations on bilateral FDI. Empirical results indicate that good interstate political relations pos-
itively inﬂuence FDI, although their eﬀect can be mitigated by the eﬀective existence of a BIT.
Through the signature of a BIT, two partner countries reciprocally abandon the use of retalia-
tory actions against foreign ﬁrms and part of their sovereignty in order to credibly signal foreign
investors their determination to oﬀer a safe business climate on a long-term basis. In addition,
the impact of a variation in the quality of domestic institutions increases with the signature of a
BIT, suggesting that the latter signals the credibility of an institutional improvement. Overall,
when both indirect eﬀects are considered, the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral FDI
stocks by 16%, on average, a lower impact than the one found in previous studies. The magni-
tude of this eﬀect nevertheless signiﬁcantly diﬀers according to the quality of both host country
domestic institutions and interstate political relations.
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Appendix A: Events and corresponding weights in Goldstein scale
Deﬁnition Goldstein Deﬁnition Goldstein
Extend military aid 8.3 Comment -0.1
Extend humanitarian aid 7.6 Decline comment -0.1
Rally support 7.6 Pessimistic comment -0.1
Extend economic aid 7.4 Ask for protection -0.1
Improve relations 5.4 Deny -1
Promise material support 5.2 Grant asylum -1.1
Promise economic support 5.2 Criticize or blame -2.2
Promise military support 5.2 Reduce routine activity -2.2
Promise humanitarian support 5.2 Complain -2.4
Agree 4.8 Informally complain -2.4
Collaborate 4.8 Formally complain -2.4
Promise 4.7 Accuse -2.8
Promise policy support 4.5 Warn -3
Endorse 3.5 Alerts -3
Forgive 3.5 Denounce or denigrate -3.4
Praise 3.4 Halt negotiations -3.8
Empathize 3.4 Reject -4
Solicit support 3.4 Reject proposal -4
Ask for material aid 3.4 Refuse to allow -4
Agree or accept 3 Defy norms -4
Ease sanctions 2.9 Impose curfew -4
Host a meeting 2.8 Censor media -4
Assure 2.8 Veto -4
Extend invitation 2.5 Political ﬂight -4
Grant 2.2 Disclose information -4
Provide shelter 2.2 Break law -4
Evacuate victims 2.2 Non-speciﬁc threats -4.4
Observe truce 2.2 Arrest and detention -4.4
Relax censorship 2.2 Political arrests and detention -4.4
Relax administrative sanction 2.2 Criminal arrests and detention -4.4
Demobilize armed forces 2.2 Administrative sanctions -4.5
Relax curfew 2.2 Sanction -4.5
Apologize 2.2 Strikes and boycotts -4.5
Acknowledge responsibility 2 Demand -4.9
Travel to meet 1.9 Expel -5
Release or return 1.9 Protest demonstrations -5.2
Request 1.6 Protest obstruction -5.2
Ask for economic aid 1.6 Protest procession -5.2
Ask for military aid 1.6 Protest defacement -5.2
Ask for humanitarian aid 1.6 Reduce or stop aid -5.6
Consult 1.5 Sanctions threat -5.8
Oﬀer peace proposal 1.5 Threaten -6.4
Call for action 1.2 Non-military force threats -6.4
Yield 1.1 Seize -6.8
Discussions 1 Police seizure -6.8
Propose 0.8 Other seizure -6.8
Yield to order 0.6 Carjacking -6.8
Yield position 0.6 Hostage taking and kidnapping -6.8
Optimistic comment 0.1 Control crowds -6.9
Ask for information 0.1 Demonstrate -6.9
Animal incidents 0 Give ultimatum -6.9
Economic activity 0 Protest altruism -6.9
Other human action 0 Military force threats -7
Human illness 0 Break relations -7
Human death 0 Threaten military attack -7
Economic status 0 Threaten military blockade -7
Other human condition 0 Threaten military occupation -7
Natural disaster 0 Threaten military war -7
Accident 0 Military clash -7
Other incident 0 Threaten nuclear attack -7
Animal attack 0 Military alert -7.6
Animal death 0 Military air display -7.6
Animal illness 0 Military naval display -7.6
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Deﬁnition Goldstein Deﬁnition Goldstein
Other animal incident 0 Military troops display -7.6
Arts and entertainment performance 0 Military demonstration -7.6
Sports contest 0 Military mobilization -7.6
Transactions 0 Military border fortiﬁcation -7.6
Government transactions 0 Riot or political turmoil -8.3
Private transactions 0 Bombings -8.7
Government default on payments 0 Seize possession -9.2
Default on payment 0 Abduction and hijacking -9.2
Elect representative 0 Military seizure -9.2
Administrative adjustment 0 Military occupation -9.2
Non-governmental adjustment 0 Military border violation -9.2
Judicial actions 0 Force -9.6
Infectious human illness 0 Physical assault -9.6
Non-infectious human illness 0 Beatings -9.6
Currency reserves 0 Shooting -9.6
Exchange rates 0 Bodily punishment -9.6
Equity prices 0 Sexual assault -9.6
Debt yields 0 Torture -9.6
Commodity prices 0 Assassination -9.6
Aﬀective state 0 Military engagements -10
Beliefs and values 0 Military raid -10
Drought 0 Coups and mutinies -10
Earthquake 0 CBR weapons use -10
Flood 0 Grenade/RPG use -10
Hurricane 0 Suicide bombing -10
Tornado 0 Mine explosion -10
Volcano 0 Vehicle bombing -10
Tsunami 0 Chemical weapons use -10
Wildﬁre 0
Hazardous material spill 0
Private default on payments 0
Source: King and Lowe (2002)
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Appendix B
Table 6: The impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI: robustness analysis
Model (1) (2)
Dependent variable FDI FDI
Estimator Poisson QMLE
ln GDP origin 0.20 0.21
(0.21) (0.21)
ln GDP host 0.31 0.31
(0.23) (0.26)
ln GDP per capita origin 3.21a 3.25a
(0.88) (0.86)
ln GDP per capita host 0.75c 0.73c
(0.41) (0.40)
ln ICRG host 0.82c
(0.47)
ln Quality of Inter. Relations (QIR) 0.10a 0.10a
(0.02) (0.02)
BIT * QIR -0.07b -0.07b
(0.03) (0.03)
BIT * ln ICRG host 0.11a
(0.03)
ln ICRG pol. host 0.69b
(0.33)
BIT * ln ICRG pol. host 0.13a
(0.03)
Regional Trading Agreement 0.21c
(0.12)
Level of democracy (home country) 0.26
(0.36)
Level of democracy (host country) -0.52c
(0.31)
GATT/WTO membership (host country) 0.08
(0.06)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 7560 7452
Number of country pairs 1080 1059
Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10%
level. All variables are in logarithms. Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
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